

# Universal quantifiers, objects, and ensembles: a case study in psychosemantics


Tyler Knowlton

University of Pennsylvania

WoSSP 19 – Nantes Université

Slides available at: [tylerknowlton.com/talks/WoSSP19.pdf](https://tylerknowlton.com/talks/WoSSP19.pdf)

# Meanings in mental grammar



# Meanings in mental grammar

## Textbook treatment of quantification:

Each/every/most/some/... frog is green



A function that essentially takes a pair of functions to TRUE iff their extensions are suitably related




A function that takes an individual to TRUE iff it's a frog



A function that takes an individual to TRUE iff it's green

Meanings



How are meanings mentally specified and how do they interface with non-linguistic cognitive systems?

# Meanings in mental grammar

## Textbook treatment of quantification:

Each/every/most/some/... frogs are green

$\#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS}) > \#(\neg \text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS})$   
 $\#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS}) > \#(\text{FROGS}) - \#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS})$   
OneToOne+(GREEN  $\cap$  FROGS,  $\neg$  GREEN  $\cap$  FROGS)  
.  
.  
.

A function that essentially takes a pair of functions to TRUE iff their extensions are suitably related

There are many logically equivalent ways of specifying the “most relation”

Meanings

Conceptual systems

How are meanings mentally specified and how do they interface with non-linguistic cognitive systems?

# Meanings in mental grammar

## Textbook treatment of quantification:

Each/every/most/some/... frogs are green

$\#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS}) > \#(\neg \text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS})$	predicate negation
$\#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS}) > \#(\text{FROGS}) - \#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS})$	numerical subtraction
$\text{OneToOne}+(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS}, \neg \text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS})$	cardinality-free
.	
.	
.	

A function that essentially takes a pair of functions to TRUE iff their extensions are suitably related

Meanings

Conceptual systems

How are meanings mentally specified and how do they interface with non-linguistic cognitive systems?

There are many logically equivalent **but psychologically distinct** ways of specifying the “*most* relation”

# Meanings in mental grammar

Textbook treatment of quantification:

Each/every/most/some/... frogs are green

$\#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS}) > \#(\neg \text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS})$  predicat  
 $\#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS}) > \#(\text{FROGS}) - \#(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS})$  numer  
OneToOne+ $(\text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS}, \neg \text{GREEN} \cap \text{FROGS})$  cardina

Leverage what's known about the cognitive system for cardinality representation to tease apart hypotheses about "psycho-logical form"

Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. ISSN 0077-8923

ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  
Special Issue: *Annals Reports*

Original Article

---

**Linguistic meanings as cognitive instructions**

Tyler Knowlton,<sup>1</sup> Tim Hunter,<sup>2</sup> Darko Odic,<sup>3</sup> Alexis Wellwood,<sup>4</sup> Justin Halberda,<sup>5</sup> Paul Pietroski,<sup>6</sup> and Jeffrey Lidz<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Linguistics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. <sup>2</sup>Department of Linguistics, University of California, Los Angeles, California. <sup>3</sup>Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. <sup>4</sup>School of Philosophy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California. <sup>5</sup>Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland. <sup>6</sup>Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey

Address for correspondence: Tyler Knowlton, Department of Linguistics, University of Maryland, 1413H Marie Mount Hall, 7814 Regents Drive, College Park, MD 20742. tzknowlt@umd.edu

Natural languages like English connect pronunciations with meanings. Linguistic pronunciations can be described in ways that relate them to our motor system (e.g., to the movement of our lips and tongue). But how do linguistic meanings relate to our nonlinguistic cognitive systems? As a case study, we defend an explicit proposal about the meaning of *most* by comparing it to the closely related *more*: whereas *more* expresses a comparison between two independent subsets, *most* expresses a subset–superset comparison. Six experiments with adults and children demonstrate that these subtle differences between their meanings influence how participants organize and interrogate their visual world. In otherwise identical situations, changing the word from *most* to *more* affects preferences for picture–sentence matching (experiments 1–2), scene creation (experiments 3–4), memory for visual features (experiment 5), and accuracy on speeded truth judgments (experiment 6). These effects support the idea that the meanings of *more* and *most* are mental representations that provide detailed instructions to conceptual systems.

Keywords: language; meaning; semantics; psycholinguistics; vision

There are many logically equivalent **but psychologically distinct** ways of specifying the "*most* relation"

# Roadmap

✓ **Broad goal: Investigating “psycho-logical forms”**

→ e.g., how *most* is mentally specified (cardinality vs. correspondence; negation vs. subtraction; ...)

**Current Case Study: *Each* vs. *Every***

→ Proposed difference: **first-order** (individuals only) vs. **second-order** (group implicating) logic

→ Proposed connection to non-linguistic cognition: **object-files** & **ensembles**

**Evidence from sentence verification**

→ Encoding/recalling **individual** vs. **group** information

**Downstream pragmatic consequences**

→ Quantifying over **small** vs. **large** domains

→ ***Every NP*** is better able to provide a **plural antecedent** than ***Each NP***

# *Each* and *every* are obviously similar

- (1) a. *Each* frog is green.  $\leftrightarrow$  *Every* frog is green. (both are universal quantifiers)  
b. Some/Most/No frogs are green.
- (2) a. \**Each*/?*Every* frog gathered by the pond. (both are distributive)  
b. All the frogs gathered by the pond.



# *Each*: ‘more individualistic’; *Every*: ‘friendlier to groups’

(3) a. Take *every* one of them.

b. Take *each* one of them...

and examine it for worms.



(4) The press is

a. *every* person who writes about the news.

b. # *each* person who writes about the news.

(5) Which book did you loan to *each* student?

*Frankenstein*  
to Frank,



*Persuasion*  
to Paula,



*Dune* to  
Dani.



(6) Which book did you loan to *every* student?

*A: There's no one book I loaned to every student.*

**The Challenge:** How to accommodate these sorts of (subtle, non-categorical) observations while also explaining the (obvious) fact that *each* & *every* are distributive universal quantifiers?


# Proposed meaning difference

*Each frog is green*

$\forall x:\text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any individual that satisfies 'Frog'  
is such that it satisfies 'Green'

(Like a series of conjunctions: Frog<sub>1</sub> is green & Frog<sub>2</sub> is green &...)




Only *every*'s meaning has a semantic constituent corresponding to a grouping of the restricted domain

*Every frog is green*

$\text{The } X:\text{Frog}(X)[\forall x:X(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ **The Frogs** are such that  
any individual that's one of them  
is such that it satisfies 'Green'

(Like the frogs each are green)




# Proposed meaning difference & related cognition

*Each frog is green*

$\forall x:\text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any individual that satisfies ‘Frog’  
is such that it satisfies ‘Green’

(Like a series of conjunctions: Frog<sub>1</sub> is green & Frog<sub>2</sub> is green &...)



## Object-file representation

Index an individuated object and anchor list of associated individual properties (e.g., color, size, ...)

(e.g., Kahneman & Treisman 1984; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs 1992; Xu & Chen 2009; Carey 2009; Green & Quilty-Dunn 2020)


Only *every*'s meaning has a semantic constituent corresponding to a grouping of the restricted domain

*Every frog is green*

$\text{The } X:\text{Frog}(X)[\forall x:X(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ **The Frogs** are such that  
any individual that's one of them  
is such that it satisfies ‘Green’

(Like *the frogs each are green*)



## Ensemble representation

Abstract away from individual properties and encode collection in terms of summary statistics (e.g., average hue, cardinality, ...)

(e.g., Ariely 2001; Chong & Treisman 2003; Haberman & Whitney 2011; Whitney & Yamanashi Leib 2018)

# Roadmap

## ✓ Broad goal: Investigating “psycho-logical forms”

→ e.g., how *most* is mentally specified (cardinality vs. correspondence; negation vs. subtraction; ...)

## ✓ Current Case Study: *Each* vs. *Every*

→ Proposed difference: *first-order* (individuals only) vs. *second-order* (group implicating) logic

→ Proposed connection to non-linguistic cognition: *object-files* & *ensembles*

## Evidence from sentence verification

→ Encoding/recalling *individual* vs. *group* information

## Downstream pragmatic consequences


→ Quantifying over *small* vs. *large* domains

→ *Every NP* is better able to provide a *plural antecedent* than *Each NP*

{Each/Every} big circle is blue

TRUE

FALSE




How many  
{big/medium/small}  
circles were there?

## Cardinality (**ensemble** property)

➔ If you initially represented **the big circles**,  
you should have a good estimate of their cardinality

### Percent error




n = 12

# Center of Mass (**ensemble** property)


(with 3- to 8-year-olds)

Is {each/every} circle blue?  
"Yes" "No"




Where was the middle of the circles?

Distance from tap to actual set center




{Each/Every}  
circle is green



TRUE FALSE

300 ms


One circle  
changed its color



TRUE FALSE

Color (**individual** property)

Change detection accuracy




Each  
Every

n = 36

# Color (*individual* property)


{Each/Every}  
circle is green



TRUE FALSE


300 ms

One circle  
changed its color



TRUE FALSE

Color change detection: difficulty required for 70% accuracy following *each* or *every*





n = 36




# Position (individual property) & Average (ensemble property)

Each/Every tone is pleasant



TRUE FALSE




Was this the first, second, or third tone?




Reproduce the average tone






How many big circles were there?

*Every* > *Each*



Where was the middle of the circles?


*Every* > *Each*



Did one circle change its color?

*Each* > *Every*


➔ *Every NP* encourages grouping the things that satisfy *NP* as an ensemble;  
*Each NP* encourages representing each thing that satisfies *NP* as an object-file




Was this the first, second, or third tone?



*Each* > *Every*



Reproduce the average tone



*Every* > *Each*

# Roadmap

## ✓ Broad goal: Investigating “psycho-logical forms”

→ e.g., how *most* is mentally specified (cardinality vs. correspondence; negation vs. subtraction; ...)

## ✓ Current Case Study: *Each* vs. *Every*

→ Proposed difference: *first-order* (individuals only) vs. *second-order* (group implicating) logic

→ Proposed connection to non-linguistic cognition: *object-files* & *ensembles*

## ✓ Evidence from sentence verification

→ Encoding/recalling *individual* vs. *group* information

## Downstream pragmatic consequences

→ Quantifying over *small* vs. *large* domains

→ *Every NP* is better able to provide a *plural antecedent* than *Each NP*

# Downstream pragmatic consequences?

*Each frog is green*

$\forall x:\text{Frog}(x)[\text{Green}(x)]$

≈ Any individual that satisfies ‘Frog’  
is such that it satisfies ‘Green’

**Strict working memory  
limit of 3**

(e.g., Vogel et al. 2001; Feigenson & Carey 2005; Wood & Spelke 2005; Alvarez & Franconeri 2007)

**Object-file representation**

Index an individuated object and anchor list of associated individual properties (e.g., color, size, ...)

(e.g., Kahneman & Treisman 1984; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs 1992; Xu & Chen 2009; Carey 2009; Green & Quilty-Dunn 2020)

*Every frog is green*

$\text{The } X:\text{Frog}(X)[\forall x:X(x)[\text{Green}(x)]]$

≈ **The Frogs** are such that  
any individual that’s one of them  
is such that it satisfies ‘Green’

**No limit to the number of  
individuals represented as  
an ensemble**


Only *every*’s meaning has a semantic constituent corresponding to a grouping of the restricted domain

**Ensemble representation**

Abstract away from individual properties and encode collection in terms of summary statistics (e.g., average hue, cardinality, ...)

(e.g., Ariely 2001; Chong & Treisman 2003; Haberman & Whitney 2011; Whitney & Yamanashi Leib 2018)

# Effects of domain size in spontaneous descriptions




# Effects of domain size in child-directed speech

How many things are being quantified over in speech to kids? (362 utterances)



“You want one bite of **each** piece, huh?”

Domain size




# Effects of domain size: forced-choice judgment

The bartender at the local tavern has made

three martinis/three thousand martinis.

He said that  martini he made  
had an olive.

each  
every



12 items; within-subjects; n=100

# Effects of domain size: free response

If someone said

*Each martini I made has an olive*

*Every martini I made has an olive*

% responses below “4”:

*Each*: 67%

*Every*: 30%

how many martinis would you guess they have in mind?

1 item; n=198



# Roadmap

## ✓ Broad goal: Investigating “psycho-logical forms”

→ e.g., how *most* is mentally specified (cardinality vs. correspondence; negation vs. subtraction; ...)

## ✓ Current Case Study: *Each* vs. *Every*

→ Proposed difference: *first-order* (individuals only) vs. *second-order* (group implicating) logic

→ Proposed connection to non-linguistic cognition: *object-files* & *ensembles*

## ✓ Evidence from sentence verification

→ Encoding/recalling *individual* vs. *group* information

## Downstream pragmatic consequences

→ Quantifying over *small* vs. *large* domains

→ *Every NP* is better able to provide a *plural antecedent* than *Each NP*

# Predicates with *same* require a comparison class

- (11) a. #Kermit is the same color (same as what??)  
b. The frogs are the same color

**Prediction:** Because *every frog* implicitly introduces the frogs, it should behave more like (11b);  
*each frog* doesn't introduce such a group, so should behave more like (11a)

# Sentence-internal *same*: forced-choice judgment


Ann and Frank decided to throw a school Halloween party.

Surprisingly, (select a word) v student showed up in the same costume

(select a word) v  
each  
every

{  $\emptyset$ .  
as their classmates. }

➔ Participants favored *every* in the absence of another source of the comparison class for *same*



➔ This preference disappeared when the comparison class was made **linguistically explicit**

# Meanings in mental grammar

## Case study: the universal quantifiers *each* and *every*

- ➔ First-order *each*; (partially) Second-order *every*
  - ⇒ Connections to well-studied cognitive systems
- ➔ Consequences for pragmatics
  - ⇒ Properties of interfacing systems affect expression use
- ➔ Consequences for language acquisition

Meanings

Conceptual  
systems

How are meanings mentally specified and how do they interface with non-linguistic cognitive systems?

# Thanks (to each & every one of you) for listening!

Collaborators on presented work:



Jeff  
Lidz



Paul  
Pietroski



Alexander  
Williams



Justin  
Halberda



Nico Cesana-  
Arlotti




Anna  
Papafragou



John  
Trueswell



Florian  
Schwarz



Victor  
Gomes



Julia  
Ongchoco

